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1 Introduction
The nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) is one of the major single-valued solution concepts
for transferable utility cooperative games. It seemingly depends on all coalitional
values, but a closer look reveals the inherent high redundancy in its definition.
Indeed, as Brune (1983), and later Reijnierse and Potters (1998) have proved: in
any n-player game there are at most 2n− 2 coalitions which actually determine the
nucleolus. Unfortunately, the identification of these nucleolus-defining coalitions is
no less laborious as computing the nucleolus itself. On the other hand, if special
properties of the game enable us to specify a priori a polynomial size characterization
family of coalitions for the nucleolus, then we can compute it in polynomial time
(in the number of players).
There are several classes of balanced games for which polynomial time nucleolus
algorithms are available in the literaure. The key to the efficiency of some of these
algorithms (e.g. in case of assignment games) is Huberman’s (1980) theorem stating
that in a balanced game all nucleolus-defining coalitions are essential (cannot be
weakly majorized by a partition) in the game, hence the inessential ones can be
ignored. Although typically not explicitly mentioned, but several other known
polytime algorithms (e.g. in case of fixed-tree games) rely on the dual counterpart
of Huberman’s result: in computing the nucleolus of a balanced game, all dually
inessential coalitions (which can be weakly minorized by a partition in the dual
game) can be ignored.
Our aim is to investigate what kinds of weighted versions of the nucleolus can
also be computed by taking into account only coalitions in these families. Since the
above mentioned reducibility results require nonemptiness of the core, our domain
will also be the class of balanced games. We are mostly concerned about the per-
capita nucleolus (Grotte, 1970, 1972), so we restrict our study to linear weight
systems. On the other hand, we allow weights that depend not only on the size,
but also on the value of the coalitions. In particular, we allow the weight of a
coalition to be equal to its value (provided it is positive), thus some of our results
also apply to the proportional nucleolus of a balanced game (with only positive
coalitional values).
The nucleolus is based on the coalitional surplusses (the difference between the
payoff to and the value of the coalition). This measure, however, does not take
into account neither the size, nor the value (or any other characteristic that maybe
important for an application) of the coalitions. Various weighted nucleoli (based on
weighted surplus measures) were considered by several authors, but mostly from an
axiomatization point of view, see e.g. (Derks and Peters, 1998), (Derks and Haller,
1999), (Kleppe, 2010), (Kleppe et al., 2016). We address issues in connection with
their computation.
In general, a linearly weighted nucleolus can be determined by the very same
methods as the (standard) nucleolus, only straightforward adjustments are needed
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that only negligibly effect the performance. This is particularly true for the most
frequently applied sequential linear programming approach pioneered by Kopelowitz
(1967) (for a recent implementation finely tuned even for large games, see (Nguyen
and Thomas, 2016)). On the other hand, and in contrast to the rich literature on
the computation of the (standard) nucleolus in specific classes of games, we can
only mention the algorithm by Huijink et al. (2015) that computes the per-capita
nucleolus in bankruptcy games. One of our results might shed light on a possible
reason for this phenomenon. We demonstrate (in Example 3) that the family of
essential coalitions is not sufficient to determine the per-capita nucleolus, not even
in a balanced game, so Huberman’s (1980) reducibility result cannot be used in the
computation of the per-capita nucleolus.
We find, however, that if we compute the nucleolus of a balanced game from the
dual coalitional values, Huberman’s idea works, not just for the (standard) nucle-
olus (that is implicitly the basis for many known efficint algorithms), but also for
the per-capita and other monotone nondecreasingly weighted nucleoli. We prove
(in Theorem 4) that if the core of the game is not empty, all dually inessential
coalitions (those which can be weakly minorized by a partition in the dual game)
can be ignored when we compute the per-capita (or other monotone nondecreas-
ingly weighted versions of the) nucleolus from the dual game. We believe that
this observation could become the theoretical basis for various polynomial time
algorithms (yet to be) designed for the per-capita nucleolus in specific classes of
balanced games known to have polynomial many dually essential coalitions (e.g.
assignment games, fixed-tree games). Other candidates for this endeavour might
be the well-known classes of games whose duality relations are discussed by Oishi
and Nakayama (2009). The usefulness of looking at the dual games also in the
axiomatizations of solutions is underlined by Oishi et al. (2016).
The organization of the paper is as follows. We collect the necessary general pre-
liminaries and introduce the linear weight systems in the next section. In section 3,
we discuss weighted least cores, since computing them is the first step in finding the
weighted (pre)nucleoli. We present properties of the weight function under which
the family of essential coalitions is sufficient to determine the weighted least core,
and also when the family of dually essential coalitions is sufficient to determine the
weighted least core in the dual game of a balanced game. In section 4, we present the
weighted primal and dual versions of the lexicographic center procedure (Maschler,
Peleg, Shapley, 1979) that sequentially reduces the set of allowable payoffs until it
shrinks to the (pre)nucleolus allocation, and discuss which properties of the weight
system make the inessential coalitions, or in the dual version the dually inessen-
tial coalitions redundant in these sequential optimization processes when applied to
balanced games.
3
2 Preliminaries
A transferable utility cooperative game on the non-empty finite set N of players is
defined by a coalitional function v : 2N −→ R that satisfies v(∅) = 0. The function
v specifies the worth of every coalition S ⊆ N . We shall denote by
N = {S ⊆ N : S 6= ∅, N}
the collection of non-trivial coalitions. The player set N will be fixed throughout
the paper, so we drop it from the notation and refer to v as the game. The game v
is called superadditive, if S∩T = ∅ implies v(S∪T ) ≥ v(S)+v(T ) for all S, T ⊆ N ;
and subadditive, if its negative −v is superadditive.
Given a game v, a payoff vector x ∈ RN is called efficient, if x(N) = v(N);
coalitionally rational, if x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ N ; where, by the standard notation,
x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi if S 6= ∅, and x(∅) = 0. We denote by Ef(v) the set of efficient
payoff vectors called the preimputation set, and by Co(v) the set of efficient and
coalitionally rational payoff vectors called the core of the game v. Games with a
non-empty core are called balanced.
The excess e(S, x, v) = v(S) − x(S) is the usual measure of gain (or loss if
negative) to coalition S ⊆ N in game v if its members depart from allocation
x ∈ RN in order to form their own coalition. Note that in any game v, e(∅, x, v) = 0
for all x ∈ RN , and the core is the set of efficient allocations which yield non-positive
excess for all non-trivial coalitions. It will be more convenient to use the negative
excess f(S, x, v) := −e(S, x, v), we call it the surplus of coalition S at allocation x
in game v.
The dual game (N, v∗) of game (N, v) is defined by v∗(S) = v(N) − v(N \ S)
for all S ⊆ N . Notice that v∗(∅) = 0, so v∗ is indeed a game, and v∗(N) = v(N),
so Ef(v∗) = Ef(v) for any game v. The name dual is explained by the relation
v∗∗(S) = v(S) for all S ⊆ N .
Since N \ S ∈ N for each S ∈ N , and
f(S, x, v) = −f(N \ S, x, v∗) for all x ∈ Ef(v) = Ef(v∗), (1)
the core of a game coincides with the anticore (where the inequalities are reversed)
of its dual game, that is,
Co(v) = Co∗(v∗) := {x ∈ Ef(v∗) : f(T, x, v∗) ≤ 0 ∀T ∈ N} . (2)
We call (2) the dual description of the core.
We will investigate which families of non-trivial coalitions are sufficient to de-
termine a solution in a game and which coalitions are redundant. Two types of
coalitions will be considered.
Coalition S ⊆ N is called inessential in game (N, v), if its value can be weakly
majorized by a proper partition, i.e. if v(S) ≤ v(S1)+ . . .+v(Sk) for some partition
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S = S1∪. . .∪Sk with k ≥ 2. A coalition is essential in a game if it is not inessential.
Observe that an inessential coalition has a weakly majorizing partition consisting
only of essential coalitions. Notice that all 1-player coalitions are essential in any
game. We denote by E(v) ⊆ N the family of essential coalitions in game v. It is
straightforward that all inessential coalitions are redundant for the core, i.e.
Co(v) = Co(E(v), v) := {x ∈ Ef(v) : f(T, x, v) ≥ 0 ∀T ∈ E(v)} . (3)
Observe that the core Co(v) = Co(N , v) is described by 1 + |N | = 2|N | − 1 lin-
ear constraints but in the restricted description Co(E(v), v) the number of linear
constraints is 1 + |E(v)| that could be significantly smaller than 2|N | − 1.
The dual description (2) of the core also has a reduced form. Coalition S ⊆ N is
called dually inessential in game (N, v), if it is anti-inessential in the dual game, i.e.
it has a proper partition S = S1∪. . .∪Sk with k ≥ 2 such that v∗(S1)+. . .+v∗(Sk) ≤
v∗(S). A coalition is dually essential in a game if it is not dually inessential. Observe
that a dually inessential coalition has a minorizing partition in the dual game that
consists only of dually essential coalitions. Notice that all 1-player coalitions are
always dually essential. We denote by E∗(v∗) ⊆ N the family of dually essential
coalitions. It is straightforward that all dually inessential coalitions are redundant
for the core, i.e.
Co(v) = Co∗(E∗(v∗), v∗) := {x ∈ Ef(v∗) : f(T, x, v∗) ≤ 0 ∀T ∈ E∗(v∗)} . (4)
The above remark on the significant reduction possibility in the size of the (dual)
core description applies here too.
The standard surplus (excess) does not take into account neither the size, nor
the value (or any other characteristic that maybe important for an application) of
the coalitions. More general excess functions were considered by several authors,
but we restrict ourselves to the weighted versions that preserve the linearity of the
measure with respect to the payoff variables.
In the sequel we assign a (maybe coalition specific) positive weight q(S) > 0 to
each non-trivial coalition S ∈ N , and define the q-weighted surplus (q-surplus for
short) of non-trivial coalition S ∈ N at allocation x ∈ RN in game v to be
fq(S, x, v) =
x(S)− v(S)
q(S)
∀S ∈ N . (5)
Note that no matter which system {q(S) > 0 : S ∈ N} of weights is used,
Co(v) = {x ∈ Ef(v) : fq(S, x, v) ≥ 0 ∀S ∈ N},
i.e., the core is the set of efficient allocations which yield non-negative q-surplus for
all non-trivial coalitions.
We say that a weight function is subadditive, if S ∩T = ∅ implies q(S) + q(T ) ≥
q(S ∪ T ) for all S, T ∈ N ; superadditive, if the inequality is reversed; additive,
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if both subadditive and superadditive; monotone nondecreasing, if S ⊂ T implies
q(S) ≤ q(T ) for all S, T ∈ N ; and monotone nonincreasing, if the inequality is
reversed.
We consider two surplus-based solutions: the least core and the (pre)nucleolus.
The weighted versions of both solutions (formally defined later) are obtained if
we replace the standard surplus measure f with the weighted surplus fq in their
respective definitions. As special cases we get
• the (standard) least core and nucleolus, if we take the monotone and subad-
ditive (but not superadditive) weight function q(S) = 1 for all S ∈ N ;
• the per-capita least core and nucleolus, if we take the monotone and additive
weight function q(S) = |S| for all S ∈ N ;
• for positive-valued game v (i.e. v(S) > 0 for all S 6= ∅), the proportional least
core and nucleolus, if we take the weight function q(S) = v(S) for all S ∈ N .
3 Weighted least cores
The least core LC(v) of a game v was first formally treated by Maschler, Peleg and
Shapley (1979) as the set of all efficient allocations that maximize the minimum
surplus of non-trivial coalitions, i.e.,
LC(v) := arg max
x∈Ef(v)
min
S∈N
f(S, x, v).
Recall that in any game the least core is a non-empty polytope.
Given a positive weight function q, the q-weighted least core LCq(v) (q-least core
for short) is defined analogously as the set of all efficient allocations that maximize
the minimum q-surplus of non-trivial coalitions, i.e.,
α1q(v) := max x∈Ef(v) min S∈N fq(S, x, v)
LCq(v) := {x ∈ Ef(v) : fq(S, x, v) ≥ α1q(v) ∀S ∈ N}. (6)
Observe that for any game v and weight function q, the uniformly guaranteed q-
surplus level α1q(v) is well defined, the q-least core is a non-empty polytope, and
Co(v) 6= ∅ if and only if α1q(v) ≥ 0. In a balanced game v, LCq(v) ⊆ Co(v), and
LCq(v) = Co(v) if and only if α
1
q(v) = 0.
The linearity of the q-surplus in the payoff variables allows us to compute α1q(v)
with the following LP with all variables x ∈ RN and α ∈ R unrestricted in sign:
α→ max
x(N) = v(N)
x(S)−q(S)α ≥ v(S) ∀S ∈ N
(7)
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Clearly, this LP has optimal solution(s), its optimum value equals to α1q(v), and its
optimal solutions are of the form (x, α1q(v)) with some q-weighted least core payoff
vector x ∈ LCq(v).
Since v(N) = v∗(N) and N also contains N \ S for each S ∈ N , if we subtract
from the efficiency equation the inequalities related to the subcoalitions and reverse
the direction of optimization by substituting α = −β, we get an equivalent LP in
terms of the dual game:
β → min
x(N) = v∗(N)
x(T )−q(N \ T )β ≤ v∗(T ) ∀T ∈ N
(8)
Notice that unless q(T ) = q(N \T ) for all T ∈ N , the inequalities in (8) can not be
expressed in terms of the q-surplus in the dual game, since in the inequality related
to T variable β is multiplied by the weight q(N \ T ) of the complement coalition.
Thus, unlike for the core, the q-least core of a game typically can not be obtained
by simply reversing the inequalities in the definition of the q-weighted least core of
the dual game. Since the general weighted version of relation (1) is
q(S)fq(S, x, v) = −q(N \ S)fq(N \ S, x, v∗) for all x ∈ Ef(v) = Ef(v∗), (9)
and f(S, x, v) = q(S)fq(S, x, v), we introduce a transformed version of the weighted
surplus in the dual game:
gq(T, x, v
∗) :=
f(T, x, v∗)
q(N \ T ) =
x(T )
q(N \ T ) −
v∗(T )
q(N \ T ) .
Then the dual description of the q-weighted least core is
β1q (v
∗) := min x∈Ef(v∗) max T∈N gq(T, x, v∗)
LC∗q(v
∗) := {x ∈ Ef(v∗) : gq(T, x, v∗) ≤ β1q (v∗) ∀T ∈ N}. (10)
Clearly, β1q (v
∗) = −α1q(v). Observe that for the standard least core LC(v) (when
q(S) = 1 for all S ∈ N ) the dual description simplifies to
LC∗(v∗) = arg min
x∈Ef(v∗)
max
S∈N
f(S, x, v∗),
that is a straightforward counterpart of its definition.
The following characterizations of weighted least-core allocations in terms of bal-
anced collections can be easily obtained by standard LP duality arguments applied
to the LP descriptions (7) or (8).
Proposition 1. An efficient payoff allocation x belongs to the q-weighted least core
of game v if and only if the family of non-trivial coalitions that satisfy either type
of the following two properties contains a (minimal) balanced collection
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1. at x, the coalition minimizes fq(S, x, v) over all coalitions S ∈ N in game v;
2. at x, the coalition maximizes gq(T, x, v
∗) over all coalitions T ∈ N in the dual
game v∗.
For the standard least core, the first type of characterization (in terms of v) is
well-known (cf. e.g. Peleg and Sudho¨lter, 2003, p.183).
There is a close relationship between the two types of (minimal) balanced col-
lection(s) mentioned in Proposition 1. If, at a q-weighted least core allocation x,
we replace all coalitions of a (minimal) balanced collection contained in the family
S1(x) of coalitions with minimum q-surplus fq(S, x, v) with their complements, we
get a (minimal) balanced collection contained in the family T 1(x) of coalitions with
maximum transformed dual q-surplus gq(N \ S, x, v∗), and vice versa.
We now identify families of redundant coalitions for weighted least cores.
Theorem 1. 1. In a balanced game v, all inessential coalitions are redundant for
LCq(v) with a subadditive weight function q. In particular, for the standard
least core LC(v) = LC(E(v), v), and for the per-capita least core LCpc(v) =
LCpc(E(v), v).
2. In a non-balanced game v, all inessential coalitions are redundant for LCq(v)
with a superadditive weight function q. In particular, for the per-capita least
core LCpc(v) = LCpc(E(v), v).
3. In any game v, all inessential coalitions are redundant for LCq(v) with an ad-
ditive weight function q. In particular, for the per-capita least core LCpc(v) =
LCpc(E(v), v).
Proof. For all three claims, let S ∈ N \E(v) be inessential in game v, because of the
partition S = S1 ∪ S2 with S1, S2 ∈ E(v) and v(S) ≤ v(S1) + v(S2). For simplicity
of notation, we assume (without loss of generality) that the weakly majorizing
partition consists only of k = 2 subcoalitions. Then at any x ∈ RN , we have the
inequalities
v(S1) + q(S1)α ≤ x(S1)
v(S2) + q(S2)α ≤ x(S2)
v(S1) + v(S2) + [q(S1) + q(S2)]α ≤ x(S)
v(S) + q(S)α ≤ x(S)
(11)
where the third one is the sum of the first two. By the above assumption, v(S) ≤
v(S1) + v(S2), so the third inequality implies the last one, hence that is redundant
for the system in (7), if [q(S1) + q(S2)]α ≥ q(S)α. This condition clearly holds, if
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1. α ≥ 0 (i.e. v is balanced) and q is a subadditive weight function.
2. α < 0 (i.e. v is not balanced) and q is a superadditive weight function.
3. q is an additive weight function.
Since S1, S2 ∈ E(v), the above argument can be independently done for any inessen-
tial S ∈ N \ E(v). The claims for the special least cores follow from the properties
of their respective weight functions.
As the following example demonstrates, the second and third statements in
Theorem 1 are not true for the standard least core LC.
Example 1. Consider the following game on player set N = {1, 2, 3, 4} given by
v(N) = v(14) = v(24) = v(124) = v(134) = v(234) = 18, v(34) = 12, v(12) =
v(123) = 6, and v(R) = 0 for all other coalitions R ∈ N .
It is easily checked that v is superadditive, but not balanced, e.g. 1
2
v(12) +
1
2
v(134)+ 1
2
v(234) = 21 > 18 = v(N). The maximum uniformly guaranteed surplus
is α1(v) = −2, the standard least core is a singleton LC(v) = {x = (2, 2, 0, 14)}.
Indeed, at allocation x, the family of coalitions with smallest surplus (= −2) is
S1(x) = {12, 14, 24, 123, 134, 234} that is the union of the (minimal) balanced
collections {12, 134, 234}, {14, 123, 234}, and {24, 123, 134}, so by Proposition 1,
x ∈ LC(v). The uniqueness of this least core allocation comes from the ”full rank
nature” of S1(x).
On the other hand, if we take into account only the essential coalitions E(v) =
{1, 2, 3, 4, 12, 14, 24, 34} in (6), we get another uniform surplus level α1(E(v), v) =
−6
5
, and another (singleton) least core LC(E(v), v) = {y = (12
5
, 12
5
,−6
5
, 72
5
)}. Indeed,
at allocation y, the family of essential coalitions with smallest surplus (= −6
5
) is
S1(E(v), y) = {3, 12, 14, 24} that is itself a (minimal) balanced collection of ”full
rank”, so by Proposition 1, y ∈ LC(E(v), v), and y is the unique E(v)-restricted
least core allocation.
In contrast, and as an illustration of the second statement in Theorem 1, the uni-
formly guaranteed per-capita surplus is α1pc(v) = −34 , the (singleton) per-capita least
core is LCpc(v) = {z = (94 , 94 ,−34 , 574 )}. Indeed, at allocation z, the family of coali-
tions with smallest per-capita surplus (= −3
4
) is S1pc(z) = {3, 12, 14, 24, 123, 134, 234}
that is the union of the balanced collections {3, 12, 14, 24} and the above S1(x).
so by Proposition 1, z ∈ LCpc(v). Since {3, 12, 14, 24} ⊂ E(v) and it is it-
self a ”full rank” (minimal) balanced collection, the restriction to the family of
essential coalitions gives the same α1pc(E(v), v) = −34 and (singleton) least core
LCpc(E(v), v) = {(94 , 94 ,−34 , 574 )} as in the unrestricted case. 
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Let us see redundant coalitions in the dual descriptions of weighted least cores.
Theorem 2. In a balanced game v, all dually inessential coalitions are redundant
for LCq(v) = LC
∗
q(v
∗) with a monotone nondecreasing weight function q. In par-
ticular, for the standard least core LC(v) = LC∗(E∗(v∗), v∗), and for the per-capita
least core LCpc(v) = LC
∗
pc(E∗(v∗), v∗).
Proof. Let T ∈ N \E∗(v∗) be dually inessential, because of the partition T = T1∪T2
with T1, T2 ∈ E∗(v∗) and v∗(T1) + v∗(T2) ≤ v∗(T ). For simplicity of notation, we
assume (without loss of generality) that the weakly minorizing partition consists
only of k = 2 subcoalitions. Then at any x ∈ RN , we have the inequalities
x(T1) ≤ v∗(T1) + q(N \ T1)β
x(T2) ≤ v∗(T2) + q(N \ T2)β
x(T ) ≤ v∗(T1) + v∗(T2) + [q(N \ T1) + q(N \ T2)]β
x(T ) ≤ v∗(T ) + q(N \ T )β
(12)
where the third one is the sum of the first two. By the above assumption, v∗(T1) +
v∗(T2) ≤ v∗(T ), so the third inequality implies the last one, hence that is redundant
for the system in (8), if [q(N \ T1) + q(N \ T2)]β ≤ q(N \ T )β. This condition
clearly holds if β = −α ≤ 0 (i.e. v is balanced) and the weight function q is
monotone nondecreasing, because then (N \ T1) ∩ (N \ T2) = N \ T 6= ∅ implies
q(N \ T ) ≤ min{q(N \ T1), q(N \ T2)} ≤ q(N \ T1) + q(N \ T2).
Since T1, T2 ∈ E∗(v∗), the above argument can be independently done for any
dually inessential T ∈ N \E∗(v∗). The claims for the special least cores follow from
the fact that their respective weight functions are monotone nondecreasing.
As the following example demonstrates, balancedness of the game in Theorem 2
is needed for both the standard least core LC and the per-capita least core LCpc.
Example 2. Consider the dual game v∗ of the 4-player non-balanced game v in
Example 1: v∗(N) = v∗(14) = v∗(24) = v∗(123) = v∗(124) = v∗(134) = v∗(234) =
18, v∗(4) = v∗(34) = 12, v∗(12) = 6, and v∗(R) = 0 for all other coalitions R ∈ N .
In the dual description (10) for the standard least core, the minimum uniformly
guaranteed transformed dual surplus is β1(v∗) = 2, and the set of optimal solutions
is the singleton LC∗(v∗) = {x = (2, 2, 0, 14)}, that is, of course, the same as LC(v)
in Example 1. We can also check it directly by the second characterization in
Proposition 1. At allocation x, the family of coalitions with largest transformed
dual surplus (= 2) is T 1(x) = {1, 2, 4, 13, 23, 34} that is the union of the partitions
{1, 2, 34}, {1, 4, 23}, and {2, 4, 13}, so x ∈ LC∗(v∗) indeed. The uniqueness comes
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from the ”full rank nature” of T 1(x). Notice that T 1(x) consists of the complements
of the coalitions in S1(x) in Example 1 and β1(v∗) = −α1(v).
On the other hand, if we take into account only the dually essential coalitions
E∗(v∗) = {1, 2, 3, 4} in (10), we get another uniform transformed dual surplus level
β1(E∗(v∗), v∗) = 3
2
, and another (singleton) optimal solution set LC∗(E∗(v∗), v∗) =
{s = (3
2
, 3
2
, 3
2
, 27
2
)}. At this allocation, T 1(E∗(v∗), s) = {1, 2, 3, 4} that is itself a
partition of ”full rank”, so by Proposition 1, s ∈ LC∗(E∗(v∗), v∗), and s is the
unique such allocation.
In the dual description (10) for the per-capita least core, the minimum uniformly
guaranteed transformed dual surplus is β1pc(v
∗) = 3
4
, and the set of optimal solutions
is the singleton LC∗pc(v
∗) = {z = (9
4
, 9
4
,−3
4
, 57
4
)}, that is, of course, the same as
LCpc(v) in Example 1. We can also confirm this by the second characterization
in Proposition 1. Indeed, at allocation z, the family of coalitions with largest
transformed dual per-capita surplus (= 3
4
) is T 1pc(z) = {1, 2, 4, 13, 23, 34, 124} that
is the union of the partitions {1, 2, 34}, {1, 4, 23}, {2, 4, 13}, and the (minimal)
balanced collection {13, 23, 34, 124}, so t ∈ LC∗pc(v∗) indeed. The uniqueness comes
again from the ”full rank nature” of T 1pc(z). Notice also here that T 1pc(z) consists of
the complements of the coalitions in S1pc(z) in Example 1 and β1pc(v∗) = −α1pc(v).
On the other hand, since only the single-player coalitions are dually essential and
gpc(k, ., v
∗) = f(k,.,v
∗)
3
= 1
3
g(k, ., v∗) for each k ∈ N , the E∗(v∗)-restricted optimiza-
tion in the per-capita case gives the same set of optimal solutions as in the standard
case. Thus, LC∗pc(E∗(v∗), v∗) = {s = (32 , 32 , 32 , 272 )}. Only the optimum value is scaled
β1pc(E∗(v∗), v∗) = 12 = 13β1(E∗(v∗), v∗). At this allocation, T 1pc(E∗(v∗), s) = {1, 2, 3, 4}
that is itself a partition of ”full rank”, so by Proposition 1, s ∈ LC∗pc(E∗(v∗), v∗),
and s is the unique such allocation. 
4 Weighted nucleoli
The (pre)nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) is a non-empty set of (pre)imputations that
consists of a single element, called the (pre)nucleolus allocation. The following
alternative definition (Maschler, Peleg, Shapley, 1979) will serve us better here.
For game (N, v) and weight function q, the q-weighted prenucleolus Nuq(v)
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(q-prenucleolus for short) is defined as the outcome of the following procedure:
Let X0 := Ef(v) and Σ0 := N ,∆0 := {N}.
For r = 1, . . . , % define recursively
αrq := maxx∈Xr−1 minS∈Σr−1 fq(S, x, v),
Xr:= {x ∈ Xr−1 : minS∈Σr−1 fq(S, x, v) = αrq},
∆r := {S ∈ Σr−1 : maxx∈Xr fq(S, x, v) = αrq},
Σr := Σr−1 \∆r, ∆r := ∆r−1 ∪∆r
where % is the first value of r for which Σr = ∅.
(13)
The final set X% is the q-prenucleolus Nuq(v) of game v. We refer to the unique
vector ηq in X
% as the q-prenucleolus-allocation.
By straightforward adjustments of the arguments given by Maschler, Peleg, and
Shapley (1979) one can easily see that
• % is well defined and finite;
• α1q(v) = α1q < α2q < . . . < α%q are well defined;
• LCq(v) = X1 ⊇ X2 ⊇ . . . ⊇ X% are non-empty polytopes;
• ∆1 ∪∆2 ∪ . . . ∪∆% forms a partition of N ,
• if S ∈ ∆k then v(S) + q(S)αkq = ηq(S),
where α1q(v) and LCq(v) are defined in (6). Notice the difference between α
1
q(v), a
characteristic of the game, and α1q , a number determined by the algorithm (13).
We now identify families of redundant coalitions for weighted prenucleoli. The
following theorem is a slight generalization of Huberman’s (1980) theorem on the
standard (pre)nucleolus that is fundamental for the efficient computability of the
(pre)nucleolus in various types of balanced games with polynomially many essential
coalitions, as it is the case e.g. in assignment games (Solymosi, Raghavan, 1994).
Huberman (1980) proves that
• in a balanced game, all inessential coalitions are redundant for the nucleolus.
Recall that for balanced games the prenucleolus is the same as the nucleolus.
Theorem 3. In a balanced game v, all inessential coalitions are redundant for
Nuq(v) with a monotone nonincreasing weight function q. In particular, for the
standard prenucleolus Nu(v) = Nu(E(v), v).
Proof. Let S ∈ N\E(v) be inessential in game v, because of the partition S = S1∪S2
with S1, S2 ∈ E(v) and v(S) ≤ v(S1) + v(S2). For simplicity of notation, we assume
(without loss of generality) that the weakly majorizing partition consists only of
k = 2 subcoalitions.
12
We prove that in all iterations r = 1, . . . , % of algorithm (13) the (inequality
or equality) constraint related to S is redundant, because it is implied by the con-
straints related to S1 and S2.
Since iteration r = 1 determines α1q(v) and the q-weighted least core, the redun-
dancy of inequalities related to inessential coalitions in a balanced game was shown
in Theorem 1.1 using (11) even under the weaker assumption of subadditivity on
the weight function. Observe that the same argument proves our claim in any other
iteration r > 1 in which all subcoalitions in the weakly majorizing essential partition
are still unsettled (i.e. Si ∈ Σr−1 for all i = 1, . . . , k), hence all related constraints
are inequalities like in (11).
Suppose now that at the beginning of iteration r > 1 coalition S is still not
settled (i.e. S ∈ Σr−1), but there are both settled and unsettled subcoalitions in
the weakly majorizing essential partition. For simplicity, let S1 ∈ ∆r−1 be settled,
and S2 ∈ Σr−1 be still unsettled. If S1 got settled at the end of iteration j ≤ r− 1,
i.e. S1 ∈ ∆j, then the related constraints in the optimization problem of iteration
r are
v(S1) + q(S1)α
j
q = x(S1)
v(S2) + q(S2)α
j
q + q(S2)(α− αjq) ≤ x(S2)
v(S) + q(S)αjq + q(S)(α− αjq) ≤ x(S)
(14)
By the above assumption, v(S) ≤ v(S1) + v(S2), so the sum of the first two con-
straints implies the third one, because (i) in iteration r variable α to be maximized
satisfies α ≥ αr−1q ≥ αjq; (ii) for a balanced game we have αjq ≥ α1q ≥ 0; and (iii)
in case of a monotone nonincreasing weight function, q(S) ≤ min{q(S1), q(S2)} ≤
q(S1) + q(S2).
Finally, suppose that at the end of some iteration r ≥ 1 coalition S becomes
settled (i.e. S ∈ ∆r). This is equivalent to saying that all subcoalitions in the weakly
majorizing essential partition have become settled by the end of that iteration. For
simplicity, let S2 ∈ ∆r be the last one to become settled. Then all related constraints
become equalities in (14), the redundancy of the last constraint, however, follows
in the same way, for all subsequent iterations.
In all three cases the constraints related to S1 and S2 imply the constraint related
to S, hence algorithm (13) yields the same outcomes even if we discard S from all
considerations. Since S1, S2 ∈ E(v), the above arguments can be independently
repeated for any inessential S ∈ N \ E(v), and the theorem follows.
The constant q(S) = 1 for all S ∈ N weight function is monotone nonincreasing,
so we get Huberman’s (1980) theorem on the redundancy of inessential coalitions
for the standard (pre)nucleolus in balanced games as a corollary.
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For completeness, we present (without proof) a characterization of weighted
prenucleoli in terms of balanced collections. It is a slight generalization of the
characterization given by Wallmeier (1984) for q-prenucleoli with monotone nonde-
creasing and symmetric (i.e. q(S) = q(|S|) for all S ∈ N ) weight function, that,
in turn is a straightforward generalization of Kohhlberg’s (1971) criterion for the
standard prenucleolus. Streamlined versions of Kohlberg’s (1971) characterization
are given in (Groote Schaarsberg et al., 2012) and (Nguyen, 2016) for the stan-
dard (pre)nucleolus, and in (Huijink et al., 2015) for the per-capita (pre)nucleolus.
Similar characterizations in more general and abstract settings that accomodate
the weighted versions discussed here can be found in (Maschler et al., 1992) and
(Potters and Tijs, 1992).
Proposition 2. An efficient payoff allocation x belongs to the q-weighted prenucle-
olus of game v if and only if the family of non-trivial coalitions whose q-surplus at
x is at least t is a balanced (or an empty) collection for any t ∈ R.
The following example demonstrates that Huberman’s (1980) redundancy result
cannot be applied for the per-capita (pre)nucleolus, we can not only use essential
coalitions, not even in a balanced game (in which case the per-capita prenucleo-
lus coincides with the per-capita nucleolus). This could partly explain why there
are much fewer special-purpose algorithms proposed in the literature for the per-
capita (pre)nucleolus than for the standard (pre)nucleolus. A recent exception is
the algorithm by Huijink et al. (2015) for the per-capita nucleolus of bankruptcy
games.
Example 3. Consider the 4-player balanced superadditive game: v(N) = 12,
v(12) = v(34) = v(123) = v(124) = v(134) = v(234) = 6, v(14) = 4, and v(R) = 0
for all other coalitions R ∈ N . Let the weight function be q(S) = |S| for all S ∈ N .
The first iteration of algorithm (13) gives α1q = 0, so X
1 = LCq(v) = Co(v), and
∆1 = {12, 34}. The second iteration gives α2q = 1 and ∆2 = {14, 123, 124, 134, 234}.
The third iteration gives α3q = 3 and ∆3 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 13, 23, 24}, and the algorithm
stops. Thus, % = 3. The only allocation in X3 (in fact, already in X2) is (3, 3, 3, 3),
it is the per-capita prenucleolus. It is easily checked also by Proposition 2. Indeed,
S1 = ∆1, S2 = ∆1 ∪∆2, S3 = ∆1 ∪∆2 ∪∆3 are all balanced families.
Let us now consider only the essential coalitions E(v) = {1, 2, 3, 4, 12, 14, 34} and
initiate algorithm (13) with Σ0 := E(v) instead of N . Then the first iteration gives
again α1q = 0, so X
1 = LCq(E(v), v) = Co(E(v), v) = Co(v), and ∆1 = {12, 34}.
On the other hand, the second iteration gives α2q = 2 and ∆2 = {2, 3, 14}. The
third iteration gives α3q = 4 and ∆3 = {1, 4}, and the algorithm stops. Thus, % = 3.
The only allocation in X3 (in fact, already in X2) is (4, 2, 2, 4), it is the per-capita
prenucleolus of the E(v)-restricted game. It is easily checked also by the restricted
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version of Proposition 2. Indeed, S1 = ∆1, S2 = ∆1 ∪∆2, S3 = ∆1 ∪∆2 ∪∆3 are
all balanced families, consisting only of essential coalitions. 
Analogously to how we obtained the dual description (10) of the q-weighted
least core from its definition (6), given a game (N, v) and weight function q, we can
alternatively get the q-weighted prenucleolus Nuq(v) from the dual game (N, v
∗)
as the outcome of the following procedure, that we call the dual description of the
q-prenucleolus:
Let X0 := Ef(v∗) and Σ̂0 := N , ∆̂0 := {N}.
For r = 1, . . . , % define recursively
βrq := minx∈Xr−1 maxT∈Σ̂r−1 gq(T, x, v
∗),
Xr:= {x ∈ Xr−1 : maxT∈Σ̂r−1 gq(T, x, v∗) = βrq},
∆̂r := {T ∈ Σ̂r−1 : minx∈Xr gq(T, x, v∗) = βrq},
Σ̂r := Σ̂r−1 \ ∆̂r, ∆̂r := ∆̂r−1 ∪ ∆̂r
where % is the first value of r for which Σ̂r = ∅.
(15)
It is easily seen that
• % is the same well-defined finite number as in procedure (13);
• β1q (v∗) = β1q > β2q > . . . > β%q are well defined, and for all r = 1, . . . , % we have
βrq = −αrq, the optimum values obtained in procedure (13);
• LC∗q(v∗) = X1 ⊇ X2 ⊇ . . . ⊇ X% is the same sequence of non-empty polytopes
as in procedure (13); in particular, X% consists of the unique q-prenucleolus-
allocation ηq defined in (13).
• ∆̂1 ∪ ∆̂2 ∪ . . . ∪ ∆̂% forms a partition of N ; moreover, for each r = 1, . . . , %,
the family ∆̂r consists of the complements of the coalitions in ∆r generated
by procedure (13);
• if T ∈ ∆̂k then ηq(T )− q(N \ T )βkq = v∗(T ),
where β1q (v
∗) and LC∗q(v
∗) are defined in (10).
We now identify a family of coalitions which are redundant in the dual descrip-
tion of weighted prenucleoli of a balanced game.
Theorem 4. In a balanced game v, all dually inessential coalitions are redundant
for Nuq(v) with a monotone nondecreasing weight function q. In particular, for the
standard prenucleolus Nu(v) = Nu(E∗(v∗), v∗) and for the per-capita prenucleolus
Nupc(v) = Nupc(E∗(v∗), v∗).
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Proof. Let T ∈ N \ E∗(v∗) be dually inessential in game v, because of the partition
T = T1 ∪ T2 with T1, T2 ∈ E∗(v∗) and v∗(T1) + v∗(T2) ≤ v∗(T ). For simplicity
of notation, we assume (without loss of generality) that the weakly minorizing
partition consists only of k = 2 subcoalitions.
We prove that in all iterations r = 1, . . . , % of algorithm (15) the (inequality
or equality) constraint related to T is redundant, because it is implied by the con-
straints related to T1 and T2.
Since iteration r = 1 determines β1q (v
∗) and the q-weighted least core, the re-
dundancy of inequalities related to dually inessential coalitions in a balanced game
was shown in Theorem 2. Observe that the same argument proves our claim in
any other iteration r > 1 in which all subcoalitions in the weakly minorizing dually
essential partition are still unsettled (i.e. Ti ∈ Σ̂r−1 for all i = 1, . . . , k), hence all
related constraints are inequalities like in (12).
Suppose now that at the beginning of iteration r > 1 coalition T is still not
settled (i.e. T ∈ Σ̂r−1), but there are both settled and unsettled subcoalitions in
the weakly minorizing dually essential partition. For simplicity, let T1 ∈ ∆̂r−1 be
settled, and T2 ∈ Σ̂r−1 be still unsettled. If T1 became settled at the end of iteration
j ≤ r− 1, i.e. T1 ∈ ∆̂j, then the related constraints in the optimization problem of
iteration r are the following:
x(T1) = v
∗(T1) + q(N \ T1)βjq
x(T2) ≤ v∗(T2) + q(N \ T2)βjq + q(N \ T2)(β − βjq)
x(T ) ≤ v∗(T ) + q(N \ T )βjq + q(N \ T )(β − βjq)
(16)
By the above assumption, v∗(T1) + v∗(T2) ≤ v∗(T ), so the sum of the first two con-
straints implies the third one, because (i) in iteration r variable β to be minimized
satisfies β ≤ βr−1q ≤ βjq ; (ii) for a balanced game we have βjq ≤ β1q ≤ 0; and (iii) in
case of a monotone nondecreasing weight function, (N \T1)∩ (N \T2) = N \T 6= ∅
implies q(N \ T ) ≤ min{q(N \ T1), q(N \ T2)} ≤ q(N \ T1) + q(N \ T2).
Finally, suppose that at the end of some iteration r ≥ 1 coalition T becomes
settled (i.e. T ∈ ∆̂r). This is equivalent to saying that all subcoalitions in the
weakly minorizing dually essential partition have become settled by the end of that
iteration. For simplicity, let T2 ∈ ∆̂r be the last one to become settled. Then all
related constraints become equalities in (16), the redundancy of the last constraint,
however, follows in the same way, for all subsequent iterations.
In all three cases the constraints related to T1 and T2 imply the constraint related
to T , hence algorithm (15) yields the same outcomes even if we discard T from all
considerations. Since T1, T2 ∈ E∗(v∗), the above arguments can be independently
repeated for any dually inessential T ∈ N \ E∗(v∗), and the theorem follows.
16
The claims for the particular (pre)nucleoli follow immediately from the mono-
tone nondecreasing nature of the respective weight functions.
Note that since the constant q(S) = 1 for all S ∈ N weight function is monotone
nondecreasing, we get the dual counterpart of Huberman’s (1980) theorem that
states the redundancy of dually inessential coalitions for the standard (pre)nucleolus
in balanced games. This is the implicit basis of various known efficient nucleolus
algorithms, e.g. (Megiddo, 1978), (Granot et al., 1996), (Braˆnzei et al., 2005), (van
den Brink et al., 2011).
We emphasize that in Theorem 4, balancedness of the game is a necessary condi-
tion. To make the point, let us consider the non-balanced dual game in Example 2:
in that game the (standard / per-capita) least core consists of a unique allocation
that is precisely the (standard / per-capita) prenucleolus.
For completeness, we present a Kohlberg-type characterization of weighted prenu-
cleoli in terms of the dual game. It is the dual counterpart of the characterization
in Proposition 2, and the analogue of the second characterization of weighted least
core allocations in Proposition 1.
Proposition 3. An efficient payoff allocation x belongs to the q-weighted prenucle-
olus of game v if and only if the family of non-trivial coalitions whose transformed
dual q-surplus gq(., x, v
∗) at x is at most t is a balanced (or an empty) collection for
any t ∈ R.
We omit the proof, since the standard LP duality arguments that prove Propo-
sition 2 can be straightforwardly adjusted to the dual description (15).
We use the balanced game in Example 3 to illustrate how Theorem 4 can help
in calculating, for example, the per-capita (pre)nucleolus. Recall that in that game
we could not use only the essential coalitions, discarding all inessential coalitions
lead to a different allocation. Now we demonstrate that we, however, can omit all
coalitions that are inessential in the dual game.
Example 4. Consider the dual game of the 4-player balanced superadditive game
in Example 3: v∗(N) = v∗(13) = v∗(14) = v∗(24) = v∗(123) = v∗(124) = v∗(134) =
v∗(234) = 12, v∗(23) = 8, and v∗(R) = 6 for all other coalitions R ∈ N . Let the
weight function be q(S) = |S| for all S ∈ N .
The first iteration of algorithm (15) gives β1q = 0, so X
1 = LC∗q(v
∗) = Co(v),
and ∆̂1 = {12, 34}. The second iteration gives β2q = −1 and ∆̂2 = {23, 1, 2, 3, 4}.
The third iteration gives β3q = −3 and ∆̂3 = {13, 14, 24, 123, 124, 134, 234}, and the
algorithm stops. Thus, % = 3. The only allocation in X3 (in fact, already in X2)
is (3, 3, 3, 3), it is the per-capita prenucleolus (cf. Example 3). It is easily checked
also by Proposition 3. Indeed, T 1 = ∆̂1, T 2 = ∆̂1 ∪ ∆̂2, T 3 = ∆̂1 ∪ ∆̂2 ∪ ∆̂3
are all balanced families. Notice that ∆̂1, ∆̂2, and ∆̂3 consists of, respectively, the
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complements of ∆1, ∆2, and ∆3, computed in Example 3. Furthermore, β
r
q = −αrq
for r = 1, 2, 3.
Let us now take only the dually essential coalitions and initiate algorithm (15)
with Σ̂0 := E∗(v∗) = {1, 2, 3, 4, 12, 23, 34} instead of N . Then the first iteration
gives again β1q = 0, so X
1 = LC∗q(E∗(v∗), v∗) = Co(E∗(v∗), v∗) = Co(v), and
∆̂1 = {12, 34}. The second iteration gives β2q = −1 and ∆̂2 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 23}, and
the algorithm stops. Thus, now % = 2. The only allocation in X2 is (3, 3, 3, 3),
it is the per-capita prenucleolus of the E∗(v∗)-restricted game, that is the same as
the above output of algorithm (15) run with the unrestricted dual input, that, in
turn, coincides with the per-capita prenucleolus of the game v (cf. Example 3).
It is easily checked also by the restricted version of Proposition 3. Indeed, T 1 =
∆̂1, T 2 = ∆̂1 ∪ ∆̂2 are both balanced families, consisting only of dually essential
coalitions. 
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